Max Stirner, Karl Marx, and Hannah Arendt
The adoption of terms like "head of State" into our political lexicon - as well as "the invisible hand of the market", "the three arms of government", "body politic", "parliamentary body", "the publicly-traded corporate (bodily) business", its "corporate head-hunters" - and also the perception that the "oneness" of the supposedly collectivist "union", the "corpus mysticum" of the Church, the notion of "corporate personhood", and ideas like Strawman Theory and Capitis Diminutio, affirm the propriety of Stirner's desire to destroy and reclaim the corporeity of these "ghosts".
That the national bank, corporations, and unconstitutional government bureaus and programs have the potential to be extended (i.e., to live) past the expiration of their charters (and indefinitely); that an American president has joked that government bureaus seem to possess eternal life; that the government still claims "legitimate violence" in asserting its right to indefinitely detain and murder us, and that the legal fiction of "corporate personhood" (which is possessed by governments, businesses, cooperatives, unions, churches, trusts, etc.) fails to obligate corporate entities to behave with the same responsibility and responsiveness which are expected of individuals, re-affirm Stirner's desire.
Perhaps we should describe what we desire as "corporate humanity".
Welfare liberalism is like asceticism in that it teaches the poor to endure their own suffering (in the case of Catholicism, with the hope that the poor will come to identify their suffering with the suffering of Christ). But liberalism largely ignores the other important role of religion, which is to encourage private charity.
Once one of the parties becomes aware that the other party believes himself to be in a position of benefit (or advantage), he may conclude that he himself must be in a position of detriment (being taken advantage of). But he may fail to take account of his own subjective desires, i.e., that he would take advantage of the other party were the opportunity presented to him (and indeed it is presented to him whenever an employment interview takes place).
It is the duty of each party to exchange to simply choose for his own purposes whether mutual aid, mutual harm, unilateral benefit, or unilateral detriment is occurring. To assume the other person is trying to harm him is an act of apprehension, neglecting the possibility of mutual aid based on subjective values.
But to ignore this apprehension and proceed with the contract is an act of good faith; it is an act of charity in which at least one party concerns himself with profiting off of the agreement, but resigns himself to rejoicing in the opportunity to help and serve another human being.
Coerced charitable giving earned through the extraction of taxes – on the other hand - is a perversion of consequentialist morality; it relieves the taxpayers’ burden of having to bother to contemplate how to act morally of their own volition, and delegates the duty of determining morality to government and to the institutionalized mediocrity resulting from the decision-making of the majoritarian will.
As in the Alex character in “A Clockwork Orange”, not being able to do evil does not make us good, so long as we still wish to do evil. I see economic systems which place emphasis on the private sphere as inherently more moral than those which do not. I say, give evil a fair shot at competing, and let the good win out by identifying evil as such.