Written on April 15th, 2012
Edited in April 2014
"If
legislation... had not created privileges for the unions, the need
for special legislation concerning them would probably not have
arisen... once special privileges have become part of the law of the
land, they can be removed only by special legislation.
Though
there ought to be no need for special 'right-to-work laws,' it is
difficult to deny that the situation created in the United States by
legislation and by the decisions of the Supreme Court may make
special legislation the only practicable way of restoring the
principles of freedom.
...Such
legislation... should not go beyond declaring certain contracts
invalid..."
-
Austrian School economist Friedrich Hayek
Over
the past year, I have been inclined to criticize
"compulsory-unionism" laws (the private-sector labor laws
which exist in non-Right-to-Work [RTW] states, pursuant to the
National Labor Relations Act), even going so far as to characterize
such laws as conferring government-afforded monopoly privileges to
labor unions.
However
- as I have determined that I had overlooked some important details
about private-sector labor laws in the course of my research, and
also that I had neglected to examine the issue in the context of
contract rights (which I have described as the basis of all
legitimate governance) - I have recently had to re-think my stance on
private-sector labor law.
Before
my recent research, I had thought that in non-RTW states, the
management of all unionized workplaces within a given state is
required to negotiate with the single labor union recognized by the
government as having the exclusive right to represent workers in
negotiation - whether or not such workers sanction and approve of
that representation - and that employees in unionized workplaces who
do not join unions within a given time frame can be fired.
Essentially,
I'd thought that in non-RTW states, all unionized workplaces had
union-shop union security agreements (henceforth referred to as
USAs).
What actually happens
in non-RTW states is that employers and labor unions are permitted to
enter into contracts functioning as USAs (which include closed-shop,
union-shop, agency-shop, fair-share-provision / dues-checkoff), which
usually entail that one particular union has the exclusive right to
represent workers within the workplace.
(In
contrast to this practice, the Industrial Workers of the World
[I.W.W. / Wobblies] support dual-unionism, the practice of two unions
to represent workers in negotiation with the management of the same
workplace).
Before
criticizing the Hayek quote and summarizing my position, I'd like to
make it clear that I am not totally reversing my stance on
private-sector labor laws.
First,
I would support legislation which would prohibit the federal and
state governments from mandating that all unionized workplaces within
given jurisdictions make closed-shop or union-shop USAs (meaning that
only union members may be employed, and that workers must join the
union within a certain time-frame in order to keep their jobs,
respectively). Although I don't think such mandates would be likely
in the U.S., I would note that Mexico had a closed-shop mandate until
about two decades ago.
Second,
I do not support any union security agreements, much less
enthusiastically so. I feel that they often:
(1)
act as unnecessary barriers of entry into the labor market,
(2)
increase unemployment levels and the cost of living,
(3)
make it less likely for new and fledgling labor unions to gain
prominence, exacerbating the oligarchicalization of agencies
representing workers in negotiation with management,
(4)
make independent ["wildcat"] strikes less likely to occur,
(5)
narrow the range of acceptable tactics for - and goals of -
negotiation, and
(6)
[in the case of union-shop agreements], fail to ensure that employees
become aware during their job interviews of their obligation to join
the union as a condition of employment within a given time-frame
[which is what happened to me at one of my first jobs].
I
do not see why there should exist an agency like the National Labor
Relations Board which has the authority to approve and deny unions'
requests to engage in strikes. I imagine that Hayek would describe
this system as a labor policy which is only practiced due to special
legislation, and I would agree with that characterization.
However,
I would not put union security agreements in the same category. I
believe that collective bargaining in the private sector is a right.
This is not to say, though, that unions have the right to compel
management to accede to their demands. What I mean is that workers'
rights to collectively bargain is limited by management's willingness
to entertain and give credence to claims of such rights.
Essentially,
anything goes, so long as government, unions, management, and those
who support them do not - and may not - compel one another to act
against their will. I would add that this notion is not fundamentally
different from the private-sector labor policy which is administered
in non-RTW states today.
At
least ideally, we have a contractual government (meaning that laws
are contracts made between consenting agents), government honors all
contracts made amongst consenting individuals, and legislation cannot
impair the obligation of contracts (contracts, however,may be
impaired retroactively as the result of judgments in lawsuits).
This
is why I find myself at odds with Hayek when he asserts that
"legislation... declaring certain contracts invalid" is
acceptable and desirable.
In
closing, the following is a summary of my policy on private-sector
labor (at least, as it stands today):
(1)
Repeal the National Labor Relations Act and abolish the National
Labor Relations Board. They are not necessary to uphold the right to
collectively bargain (which existed prior to - and exist
independently of - the current federal private-sector labor-policy
system), and they diminish the role of independent,
non-government-sponsored unions.
(2)
Repeal the Taft-Hartley Act, invalidating state Right-to-Work laws.
These laws impair the obligation of contracts, which - whether
retroactively or not - are inhibitive of individual rights and the
freedom of association.
(3)
Enact legislation prohibiting the federal and state governments from
mandating closed-shop and union-shop union security agreements in all
unionized workplaces within the given jurisdictions.
(4)
Vociferously discourage unions and management from making union
security agreements in negotiation.
(5)
Encourage unions and management to practice members-only collective
bargaining and open-shop agreements, in order to counter-act the
free-rider problems which arise as the result of success of point
(4).
(6)
Encourage dual- and multiple-unionism. Encourage unions, union
members, and union supporters to tolerate competition by other
unions, and encourage management to negotiate with multiple unions.
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