Sunday, October 24, 2010

The Platonic Forms


 
Plato (ca. 427 - 347 BC)

In the Parmenides, Plato, represented by Socrates, thinks that objects can be at once both one and many. He thinks this because an object can be shown to partake of oneness when it is shown to be a single entity out of multiple separate entities, and an object can be shown to partake of multitude when it is shown to be comprised of several parts. Socrates tells Zeno that he would be amazed if someone were to distinguish opposite forms (i.e., oneness and multitude) as separate things, and then show that in themselves the forms can mix together and separate.

Parmenides gets Socrates to agree that things partake of forms by being likened to them, and that things cannot be dissimilar to things they are like. This poses a problem because it means that if something were shown to be both one and many, then it has oneness and multitude, so it is similar to both oneness and to multitude, so the thing and its two forms are all similar, so the thing is both forms themselves, so both forms are the same.

Plato thinks (and has Socrates and Parmenides agree) that someone who won’t allow that there are forms will “destroy the power of discourse” because “he won’t have a direction for his thought, since he doesn’t allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same”. Parmenides argues that there are difficulties and objections involved in trying to make sense of the forms, so people argue that the forms “do not exist, and that, even if they do, they must by strict necessity be unknowable to human nature”.

Parmenides thinks that a form is separate from itself if everything that partakes of a form partakes of it as a whole because the form is separate from the things that partake of it.

This is not a good argument against the forms because Parmenides is thinking of a form as if it were an object of finite size instead of as a property. He seems to think that when several things share the same property, they can somehow use it up and take it away from itself. This is why using the phrase “to get a share of” instead of “to partake of” can be misleading, because “to get a share of” gives the impression that when a thing gets a share of a form, part of the form is lost to the thing, causing the parts of the form to separate.

Parmenides is right to say that Socrates’ example of the day is like his own example of the sail because they both cover many parts at once and part of each covers different places and different things. Those things exist during the day and under the sail, all at once, without the day or the sail having to be divided so that the things can fall under them.

In the dialogue, Parmenides presents the argument that objects partaking of a form have sameness, which makes the observer conclude that the form is one thing. When the observer thinks of the form and the things that partake of the form, the mind’s eye views them all as sharing a form that is different from the first form. Objects partaking of the form largeness and largeness itself partake of a form labeled the “third large.” Each time one thinks of what is common to a form and things that partake of it, a separate, different form is conceived of in the mind. The “fourth large” would be partaken of by the “third large,” largeness itself, and large things, and so on.

Parmenides says, “There is for each thing some being, itself by itself… to begin with” and “the forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves”, which is to say that forms do not originate in the things that partake of the forms. This could provide an escape from the “third large” argument, but another problem is encountered when Parmenides says this argument means we cannot possess the forms themselves, so we cannot possess knowledge itself, but if anything partakes of knowledge itself, it is a god that does so. This is a problem because it contradicts Parmenides’ and Socrates’ earlier agreement that “the forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves”.

Considering the forms thoughts would not help escape the argument. Socrates says, “[E]ach of the forms is a thought of the many… and properly occurs only in minds”. Socrates thinks that the mind recognizes a form when it observes many things partaking of it, and that to partake of a form is to be likened to it. Parmenides says that if Socrates is correct and a thing and a form resemble each other, and if “that which is like… partake[s] of the same one thing as what is like it”, “and if like things are like by partaking of something”, then that something is the form itself. Parmenides ends this argument by concluding that the thing and the form cannot be alike, otherwise “a fresh form will never cease emerging”, so this argument fails to refute the “third large” argument.

I believe that Platonic forms can be salvaged. Considering the forms thoughts comes close to refuting the “third large” argument, but a different approach must be taken. I think it is true that “each of the forms is a thought of the many… and properly occurs only in minds”, but I disagree that to partake of a form is to be likened to it. I think things are what they are in and of themselves, but I think forms are dependent on the things that partake of them.

Each form is a positive or negative value of a dimension, and thus each form has an opposite. For example, large and small are positive and negative values of size, and beauty and ugliness are positive and negative values of aesthetics. Thus, when a thing partakes of a form, it does not get a share of one form or the other; rather, a thing’s size or beauty is relative. It depends on what other thing – something bigger, smaller, more beautiful, or more ugly – it is being compared to.

This conflicts with superexemplification because it rejects the proposal that a form is the thought of a perfect example, which is to say, using my examples, that there is something of ultimate size or beauty, of which everything else large or small or beautiful or ugly is a thought.

If we imagine something with a size, and that size were greater than the size of the smallest conceivable thing and smaller than the size of the largest conceivable thing, this would present no problem because everything besides those two things fits that description. But this is distinct from claiming that the universe is largeness itself, or a subatomic particle is smallness itself. Size is relative. It is possible to conceive of something larger than the universe, and it is possible to conceive of something smaller than a subatomic particle. Every description we can attach to something only exists relative to its opposite.


Originally Written in October or November 2007 as a college essay



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Sifre Deuteronomy 26: Moses and David


            
 Moses and David

Sifre Deuteronomy 26 comments on Deuteronomy 3:23, the story in Scripture in which Moses asks God to allow him to cross the river Jordan and enter the land of Israel. The commentary focuses on the passage, “And I besought the Lord at that time, saying…,” among others, and independently addresses fragments of that passage. It discusses two leaders of Israel, Moses and David, and how they answered God for their sins. The text shows the difference between Moses’ and David’s methods of asking for forgiveness, and re-interprets the consequences of those methods as evidence that God will forgive a person who recognizes that they have sinned, recognizes what they are guilty of, and recognizes that they should be punished.

The first commentary on the scriptural passage focuses on the choice of the word used to describe the action Moses performed to God. This translation of Scripture uses “saying.” The commentary makes clear that here, “saying” is not simply an address from one person to another to be taken at face value and understood as one that does not stand in contrast to any other verb that could be used in its place. Rather, “saying” is one of several types of prayer and the word has been chosen over other verbs because of their connotations, which are to be understood based on context.

In Deuteronomy 3:23, “saying” is used in conjunction with “besought.” The commentary says that what Moses has said is explained by Proverb 18:23, which says, “The poor useth entreaties, but the rich answer impudently.” This can be interpreted as the author of the commentary saying that, since Moses uses the word “besought,” he is using entreaties, or that, because he uses the word “saying,” he is answering impudently. To agree with either would be to characterize Moses as either poor or rich, respectively.

After this, the commentary moves to the discussion of Moses’ request that God record his transgression. Moses says to God, “…let any transgression that I have committed be recorded against me, so that people will not say, ‘Moses seems to have falsified the Torah,’ or ‘said something he had not been commanded to say.’” Moses wants the sin of which he is guilty to be known, so that when the people know he has been punished and not allowed to enter the land of Israel, they will know the reason for his punishment and not assume he was punished for any other reason.

The sin of which Moses is guilty is having disobeyed God’s command that he speak to a rock so that water will issue forth from it. Moses instead struck the rock, which once before, on an occasion when God commanded Moses to do so, caused water to come.

Following this, a parable is told of a woman who gathered and ate unripe figs against the decree of the king, and was punished by being paraded in disgrace around the arena. The woman asked the king that her offense be publicly proclaimed so that the people will not think she is guilty of some other crime such as adultery or witchcraft.

According to Scripture, God told Moses that he recorded that the reason for Moses’ punishment was that he rebelled against God’s commandment that he speak to the rock.

The next parable tells of a king whose son was injured when they were traveling, and each time the king passed the scene of the accident after that, he would say that that was the place where his son was injured. The commentary draws a connection between this parable and what happened to Moses by saying, “Thus also God mentions three times the waters of contention…, as much to say, ‘This is where I doomed Miriam, …Aaron, [and]…Moses.’”

Following this parable, the commentary moves from Moses to David. The sin of which David is guilty is having caused the death of Uriah the Hittite and having married his wife Bathsheba. David said to God, “Let not this transgression committed by me be recorded against me.” This stands in contrast to Moses’ request to God that the transgression that he committed be recorded against him.

God denies David’s request by telling him, “It is not fitting for you that people should say, ‘God forgave him because He favors him.’” To not record David’s transgression would be to forgive him without David having asked for forgiveness. This is what sets Moses and David apart. Moses’ request that his transgression be recorded against him serves two purposes: it makes the truth known to the people, and it acts as an acknowledgement that Moses has sinned. Once Moses has acknowledged that he has rebelled against God, he is eligible for forgiveness. But because David has asked God not to acknowledge his sin, he will not be forgiven. Although David seeks the same ends as Moses, he sought forgiveness from God in the wrong way.

Next, a parable is told of a man who borrowed a large amount of wheat from the king. The people saw that it was such a large amount that it would be difficult for the man to repay the king, so they thought the king gave the wheat to the man as a gift. But when the man could not repay the king, the king sold the man’s family into slavery, so the people knew the wheat was not a gift and that the king held the man accountable.

In this parable, the king and the man represent God and David, the wheat represents the bounty that God gave to David, and the selling of the man’s family into slavery represents David’s punishment. The parable serves as a reminder that everything that David has was given to him by God, and David is obligated to repay him with obedience. Even though it may appear to the people that God favors David, God will punish anyone who does not fulfill their obligation to Him in exchange for everything He has bestowed upon them.

In 2 Samuel 12, Nathan tells David about a rich man who had many sheep and cattle and a poor man who had only one ewe lamb. When a hungry traveler came to them, the rich man slaughtered the poor man’s ewe lamb instead of slaughtering one of his own many cattle in order to feed the traveler. David immediately cursed the rich man for having no pity on the poor man, saying that the rich man is worthy of death and that he should pay for that ewe four times over.

Nathan then tells David that he represents the rich man in the story. Nathan reminds David of all that God has given him, and that he has sinned against God by causing the death of Uriah and marrying his wife. David then said to Nathan, “I have sinned against the Lord,” and Nathan said, “The Lord also hath put away thy sin; thou shalt not die.” Thus, as soon as David recognizes that he has sinned against God, he is absolved of his sin.

The commentary says that, as in the story of the men and the lamb, “So also all the punishments which came upon David were made multiple, as it is said, ‘And he shall restore the lamb fourfold.’” This is the author of the commentary suggesting that when David responded to the story by saying that the rich man should be punished fourfold, he caused his punishment to be made multiple.

The next section of the commentary says that Moses’ and David’s “meritorious deeds could have sustained the whole world, yet they begged the Holy One… only for a favor.” Then it is asked, “If those whose meritorious deeds could have sustained the whole world requested from the Holy One… only a favor, how much more so should a person who is not even one thousand-thousand-thousandth… part the disciples of their disciples beseech the Holy One… only for a favor.”

To say this is to assert that Moses’ and David’s good deeds entitle them to something. But it is also to say that the thing that God could have done in exchange for Moses’ and David’s good deeds was to sustain the whole world, and that Moses and David, by asking God for favors, forfeit the sustenance of the whole world in favor of the satisfaction of their own desires.

The next section of the commentary lists ten terms for prayer and cites examples from Scripture in which the different words are used.

Next, a parable is told about the people of a city, who thought of asking their king to grant their city the status of a colony, and they asked him after he had defeated two of his enemies, because they knew the time was right to do so. When Moses saw Sihon and Og defeated by God, he thought it would be a good time to ask Him to enter the land of Israel. The purpose of this parable is to explain the use of the phrase “at that time,” from the original Deuteronomy passage, “And I besought the Lord at that time, saying….”

Then, the text addresses the use of the word “saying.” It states several times that “Scripture does not use the term ‘saying’ except for a special purpose.” Between these statements, the text cites other passages in Scripture in which the word is used, each time re-interpreting Moses’ request to God that he be let into the land of Israel. The interpretations include “Let me know whether I will fall into their hands or not,” “Let me know whether Thou wilt redeem them or not,” “Tell me whether Thou wilt heal her or not,” “Let me know whether Thou wilt appoint leaders for them or not,” and “Let me know whether I will enter the land or not.”

The commentary ends by showing the distinction between two names of the Lord, Adonay and Elohim. By examining contexts in which each name for God is used, the commentary concludes that the name Adonay is used to refer to God’s quality of mercy, while the name Elohim is used to refer to his quality of justice.

Sifre Deuteronomy 26 takes the passage in which Moses asks God to allow him to enter the land of Israel and juxtaposes Moses’ relationship with God and David’s relationship to God to teach a lesson about not taking God’s gifts for granted and about the proper way to seek forgiveness from God. It discusses the meaning of “besought” and “saying” and clarifies the meaning of “at that time” in the original passage, and it also shows that Moses’ and David’s request for favors, which at surface value would appear to benefit them, actually would do harm to the whole world.



Written in October 2007 as a college essay




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Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Form of the Good

                  

Greek philosophers Plato (ca. 427 - 347 BC) and Aristotle (384 B.C.E. - 322 B.C.E.)


The categories are Aristotle’s attempt to place the senses of being into ten classifications. They are substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection.

Aristotle argues against the Platonists’ view that there is such a thing as the “form of the good.” Aristotle believes that good is not a single, common universal because what it is to be good is particular to the essence of the individual; that is, what makes something good varies depending on what the thing is.

Aristotle defines what goodness is with respect to each category of being. For example, he says the good place is the right situation, the good relative is the useful, and the good time is the opportune moment. He says that if good were a common and single universal, it would be spoken of in only one of the categories and not in them all.

To describe two different individuals as “good” is to assign them a homonymous quality. They are both called “good,” but what it is to be good is different for the two individuals. For example, what it is to be a good master is different from what it is to be a good slave because different properties define each individual and different properties define what makes each individual good. Were a slave to try to be a good slave by partaking in that which makes his master a good master, he would either cease to be good, cease to be a slave, or both.

Aristotle says that “good” is the same as “good itself” because they both have the same account of “good” in the same way that “the human being itself” and “human being” have the same account of “human being”. To argue this is to disagree with the Platonic idea that “good” and “human being” are individuals that partake of the forms “good itself” and “the human being itself.” To add the word “itself” to an idea is to suggest that the idea is a form that is dependent upon the things that partake of it.

Aristotle also says, “good itself will be no more of a good by being eternal; for a white thing is no whiter if it lasts a long time than if it lasts a day”. Aristotle means that just because some individual may have a quality that is thought of as a perfection, it does not mean that that individual is any more perfect with respect to what makes that individual what it is. In other words, if an individual (“f”) has a perfection (“p”), its “f-ness” is not affected.

Next, for the Platonist who would respond to his criticisms by distinguishing goods which are good in their own right from goods which are merely useful, Aristotle poses a dilemma. He asks, “is nothing except the Form good in its own right, so that the Form will be futile?” He then says that if practical wisdom, pleasures, and honors are goods in their own right, and if there is a Form of good, then the same account of good turns up in all of them. He says those three things have different and dissimilar accounts, so “the good is not something common corresponding to a single Form”.

When Aristotle says that good “is not like homonyms resulting from chance,” he means that it is not due to chance that one definition of “good” shares something with another. “Good” has many meanings depending on the nature of the individual to which it is applied. This is why the idea “good” can be represented in a single word; for each individual, there exists a property or a set of properties required for the individual to be called “good.”

Aristotle also asks whether good is spoken of by analogy. This may be so, as when two individuals each have the set of properties that respectively make them good, the goodness of one individual is analogous to the goodness of the other with respect to what the individuals are and what makes them good, even though the properties that make them good may be in completely different categories.

Aristotle says that in trying to determine whether there is a Form of the Good, we are looking for “the sort of good which a human being can possess or achieve in action.” He says, “If there is some one good predicated in common, or some separable good, itself in its own right,” that is not the sort of good that we can possess or achieve. He disagrees with the proposition that if we have a view to the Form of the Good “as a sort of pattern, we shall also know better about the goods that are goods for us, and if we know about them, we shall hit on them.”

Aristotle says it is useless for a craftsman to know good itself because the craftsman has nothing to gain by knowing it. What makes a doctor or a weaver or a carpenter useful is his understanding of the work he practices; not simply knowing good itself and thus being able to partake of it.

It may not be the case that the “possess and achieve in action” argument is an argument against Plato at all. What is probable is that it was not intended as an argument, but rather as a rationalization. In this section of the text, Aristotle is not using his statement about the uselessness of understanding the Form of the Good to mankind to argue against its existence, but  rationalizing the difficulty of determining, once and for all, the answer to the question of whether there exists a Form of the Good.

Aristotle’s weakest argument against Plato is the argument that “good itself will be no more of a good by being eternal, for a white thing is no whiter if it lasts a long time than if it lasts a day”. Aristotle is trying to say that if an individual “f” has a perfection “p”, the “f-ness” possessed by “f” is no greater. This statement seems true, as it does not contradict Aristotle’s assertion that for an individual to have a superfluous characteristic in a state of perfection does not make that individual any more “good.” However, the first statement makes it necessary to ask, What does Aristotle think is the property that allows for goodness itself to be good?

Aristotle’s strongest argument against Plato is the argument that good is spoken of as an analogy. If two individuals are described as good, a Platonist would take that to mean that both individuals partake of the same thing, goodness. Aristotle, on the other hand, understands that the individuals are good with respect to what it is for each individual to be good. He rejects the idea that their goodness is the same, but he also rejects the idea that they are both called good for no reason whatsoever. Instead, he sees goodness as something abstract and difficult to define, proposing that the goodness possessed by the individuals are analogous with respect to what makes the individuals what they are. This argument is fair to Plato in that it seems to reconcile that notion with Plato’s position that the Form of the Good exists as something that encompasses all different types of good.



Originally written in November or December 2007 as a college essay






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Distinctions in Death Penalty Sentencing in Sanhedrin 67


 
Tractate Sanhedrin, folio 67a-b of the Babylonian Talmud contains a discussion of the proper death penalty for a person who is found guilty of inciting others to idolatry and for a sorcerer.

Before going further into this discussion, some background on the death penalty is required.

In ancient Israel, stoning was the customary mode of execution. According to Josef Blinzler, “stoning became the regular mode of execution because the participation of the community was more possible than with any other form of execution.” Blinzler adds that the Old Testament “very often explicitly call[s] for… those who carry out the punishment [to] appear as ‘the whole community.’” It was necessary to involve the community in an execution because the whole community was thought to be responsible to God for the crime committed by the person being executed.

Blinzler, quoting I. Benzinger and Kurt Latte, says, “‘The whole community participates in the stoning as a way of riddling itself with guilt.’ ‘By showing his horror at the deed through casting his stone and dissociating himself from the perpetrator, each individual hoped to escape the vengeance of the gods who could visit unexpiated sins on the whole community.’” Blinzler also points out that it may be that the crime was perceived as directed at all the people, and not only at Yahweh, and therefore must be punished by as many people as possible, in order to “bring home to each individual in a particularly impressive and vivid way the reprehensibility of certain failings.”

According to Rabbi Richard A. Block, there is also “support for the notion that capital punishment was preventative. Since capital punishment was held to expiate the crime, it was also said to be in the interest of both society and the defendant.”

Considering that, according to Scripture, several explicitly mentioned types of incest, homosexuality, bestiality, blasphemy, several types of idolatry, profaning the Sabbath, cursing one’s father or mother, beguiling others to idolatry, sorcery, and being stubborn and rebellious are all deemed punishable by death, it would seem that the death penalty would be administered too frequently to be considered fair.

However, although the rabbis disagree on whether the death penalty should ever be imposed, “the anonymous mishnah, which presents the authoritative position, holds that the death penalty should be imposed infrequently, not never.”

David Novak describes the practice of hatra’ah, or ‘forewarning,’ which consists of the witnesses informing the criminal that he is about to commit a crime proscribed by the Torah, its punishment, the status of the victim, and the criminal telling the witnesses that he is going to commit the crime anyway. This was done to ensure that the criminal was compos mentis. It effectively made capital punishment very rare, as hatra’ah alerted the criminal to the presence of witnesses, and made it unlikely that the criminal would proceed with the crime.

Josef Blinzler explains why, according to Scripture, stoning has to be carried out outside the camp or the city. He quotes Rudolf Herzel in doing so: “[Taking the guilty party outside the house for the stoning] only became natural when, in accordance with the original intention of stoning, there was a desire to give the accused and condemned man the possibility of fleeing.” This explanation is one of several cited by Blinzler, including that people and property may be hurt if the stoning were to take place in the home, and so “the city should not be polluted by the corpse of the executed person.”

There are more specific accounts of execution in Scripture, but it is debatable whether these accounts were written as regulations concerning how the executions should take place or instead as descriptions of how the executions normally take place.

Chapter 6 of Sanhedrin gives an account of execution by stoning in which several steps are taken in a certain order, and each step is only necessary if the previous step does not cause the death of the accused person. The witness throws the accused to the ground, then witness by witness drops a stone on his heart. If this does not cause his death, he is stoned by all the people, after they all place their hands on him.

Chapter 7 of Sanhedrin gives accounts of execution by burning, beheading, and strangulation. To begin either, the people set the convicted “in dung up to his knees,” and then they put “a towel of coarse stuff within a towel of soft stuff,” and wrap it around his neck. They then pull on the ends of the towel.

R. Judah says, “If thus he died at their hands they would not have fulfilled the ordinance of burning.” This means that, as with the procedure of stoning, the burning or beheading is only necessary if the convicted does not die from the strangulation. According to Rabbi Richard A. Block, “Of the four [methods of execution], strangulation was preferred by rabbis because it was the one that did least injury to the body.”

If burning is necessary, two witnesses pull the ends of the towels until he opens his mouth, and a wick, or a strip of lead, is kindled and thrown into his mouth, burning his entrails. According to R. Judah, if beheading is necessary, it is to be done by placing the convicted’s head on a block, and the beheading performed with an axe, as the Roman method of using a sword is “shameful.”

At the beginning of folio 67a-b, Mishnah declares that a person who is found guilty of inciting others to idolatry “is brought to Beth Din and stoned.” Gemara explains that the person is only stoned because he is a layman, and that if he is a prophet, he is strangled. According to the Rabbis, prophet or not, a person who leads people astray is to be stoned and not strangled. The next Mishnah quote says that a sorcerer is liable to death if he actually performs magic, but he is not liable to death if he merely creates illusions.

Next, Gemara goes much deeper into discussion of the death penalty as the phrase “thou shalt not suffer a witch (to live)” is put under much scrutiny.

R. Jose the Galilean says that this phrase’s similarity to “thou shalt not suffer anything that breatheth (to live)” means that the punishment for sorcery is “the sword,” meaning beheading.

If the purpose of the death penalty is to remove from society those who have committed the gravest offenses, why is it necessary that there be a preferred method of execution for different types of people and for different crimes?

Chapter 7 of the Babylonian Talmud tractate Sanhedrin, in listing the four types of capital punishment that could be inflicted by the court, reveals that there is a descending order of gravity for the methods of execution: burning, stoning, strangulation, beheading. This may be a reason for differentiating the methods and a basis for deciding when each method is appropriate.

R. Akiba likens the phrase “thou shalt not suffer a witch (to live)” to “there shall not a hand touch it, but he shall surely be stoned, or shot through, whether it be beast or man, (it shall not live),” so he believes this similarity calls for the convicted to be stoned or shot through.

So why is being “shot through” not viewed as a separate method of execution from being stoned, as different as are strangulation, beheading, and burning?

Josef Blinzler offers the explanation that the phrase “stoned or shot through” unites the two methods of death because, since the stones and arrows are both thrown, and the person “is shot” by both objects. He mentions specifically Exodus 19.13, in which “Going on the mountain was strictly forbidden to everyone. Anyone who transgressed the command could only be got at by throwing stones or shooting arrows at him…”

R. Jose the Galilean contends that R. Akiba’s analogy is false because he wrongfully compares “thou shalt not suffer (to live)” with “it shall not live,” when R. Jose has made an analogy between ‘Thou shalt not suffer (to live)’ written in two verses.”

Because R. Akiba draws an analogy between two verses referring to Israelites, he disagrees with R. Jose the Galilean’s analogy because he believes it compares Israelites to heathens, “in whose case only one death penalty is decreed.”

Does this mean that when a heathen is sentenced to death, it is always by stoning? According to Scripture, “if a heathen committed adultery with a betrothed maiden, he is stoned; with a fully married woman, he is strangled,” so the way a heathen is executed is therefore subject to debate and not restricted to stoning.

R. Judah says of Ben ‘Azzai’s argument, “Shall we, because of this proximity, exclude the former from the easier death implied by an unspecific death sentence changing it to stoning?”, and takes the position that “as the ob and yidde’oni were singled out so that other sorcerers may be assimilated to them,” because they were stoned, all sorcerers are stoned.

This reference to “an unspecific death sentence” makes it necessary to ask when the method of execution is specified. According to Josef Blinzler, when the Old Testament calls for execution for a crime without specifying the mode of execution, it is assumed that the convicted is to be stoned.

On the contrary, Walter Jacob says that, in accordance with new rules, “Strangulation was used for all crimes in which no other death penalty was specified; it was considered the most humane method of execution.”




Bibliography

1. Blinzler, Josef. “The Jewish Punishment of Stoning in the New Testament Period.” The Trial
of Jesus. Ed. Ernst Bammel. Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson Inc., 1970. 147-161.

2. Block, Rabbi Richard A. “Capital Punishment.” Crime and Punishment in Jewish Law: Essays
and Responsa. Ed. Walter Jacob and Moshe Zemer. New York / Oxford: Berghan Books, 1999. 64-73.

3. m. Sanhedrin 7

4. Novak, David. “Can Capital Punishment Ever Be Justified in the Jewish Tradition?” Religion
and the Death Penalty: A Call for Reckoning. Ed. Erick C. Owens, John D. Carlson, and Eric P. Elshtain. Grand Rapids, Michigan / Cambridge, U.K.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004. 31-47.

5. m. Sanhedrin 6

6. b. Sanhedrin 67a-b

7. b. Sanhedrin 57b
8. Jacob, Walter. “Punishment: Its Method and Purpose.” Crime and Punishment in Jewish Law:
Essays and Responsa. Ed. Walter Jacob and Moshe Zemer. New York / Oxford: Berghan Books, 1999. 45-63.


Written in October or November 2007 as a college essay



For more entries on justice, crime, and punishment, please visit:
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http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/01/the-war-on-drugs.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/02/fourth-amendment-image.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/04/on-legalizing-heroin.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/04/15-reasons-to-legalize-marijuana.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/04/john-locke-roderick-long-and-voluntary.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/04/social-policies-for-2012-us-house.html

For more entries on world religions and mysticism, please visit:
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2010/10/syncretism-of-and-similarities-between.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2010/10/bwiti-religion-nganga-and-tabernanthe.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2010/10/sifre-deuteronomy-26.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2010/11/anarchistic-theocracy.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2011/02/terence-mckenna-and-novelty-calendar.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2011/04/materialism-stirner-vs-marx.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2013/07/letter-to-freedom-from-religion.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-piscean-ethic-in-government-ecology.html
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Thrasymachus’ Support for Justice Being the Advantage of the Stronger

 Greek sophist Thrasymachus of Chalcedon
(ca. 459 - 400 B.C.E.)


In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus claims that “the just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.” Asked by Socrates to explain the statement, Thrasymachus says that in each city that is ruled tyrannically, democratically, or aristocratically, the ruling group is master. He says, “each ruling group sets down laws for its own advantage; a democracy sets down democratic laws, a tyranny, tyrannic laws; and the others do the same. And they declare that what they have set down… is just for the ruled, and the man who departs from it they punish as a breaker of the law and a doer of unjust deeds.” He says, “in every city the same thing is just, the advantage of the established ruling body. It surely is master, so the man who reasons rightly concludes that everywhere justice is the same thing, the advantage of the stronger.”

While Socrates examines Thrasymachus’ point of view, he gets Thrasymachus to say that it is just to obey the rulers, and also that rulers sometimes makes mistakes, setting down some laws correctly and some incorrectly. Thrasymachus agrees that a law that sets down what is advantageous for the rulers is correct, and the law that sets down what is disadvantageous for the rulers is incorrect.

Socrates tells him that, according to his argument, “it’s just to do not only what is advantageous for the stronger but also the opposite, what is disadvantageous”. Thrasymachus defends his statements by saying, “I suppose that each [the doctor and the calculator]…, insofar as he is what we address him as, never makes mistakes.” He says, “The man who makes mistakes makes them on account of failure in knowledge and is in that respect no craftsman.” and “…the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does not make mistakes; and not making mistakes, he sets down what is best for himself.”

Socrates and Thrasymachus agree that the doctor is one who cares for the sick and not primarily a money-maker, and that the pilot is a ruler of sailors and not primarily a sailor. They also agree that the art, whether it is medicine or ruling sailors, is “directed toward seeking and providing for the advantage of each”. Socrates says “there isn’t ever anyone who holds any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, who considers or commands his own advantage rather than that of what is ruled and of which he himself is the craftsman; and it is looking to this and what is advantageous and fitting for it that he says everything he says and does everything he does.”

Here, Thrasymachus, rather than agreeing, tells Socrates that he thinks that shepherds, cowherds, and rulers only take care of their subjects as it relates to how they themselves, the rulers, will benefit, and that he thinks that Socrates would disagree. Thrasymachus reasons that “the just man everywhere has less than the unjust man”, and he speaks of situations in which the just man suffers more than the unjust. He says there is more advantage in being unjust than there is in being just, and that “injustice… is mightier, freer, and more masterful than justice”, reiterating that the just is the advantage of the stronger, and adding that “the unjust is what is profitable and advantageous for oneself.” He thinks that injustice rules the just, that people who serve make their rulers happy but do not make themselves happy. Socrates responds to this by suggesting that Thrasymachus thinks of the shepherd as primarily a money-maker and not a shepherd, and argues that “art surely cares for nothing but providing the best for what it has been set over”.

They agree that rulers rule willingly, though not voluntarily, as they demand wages. Socrates says, “the benefit the craftsmen derive from receiving wages comes to them from their use of the wage-earner’s art in addition.” Thrasymachus agrees with Socrates that if the craftsman were not paid, he would derive no benefit from practicing his craft, and so Socrates says that “no art or kind of rule provides for its own benefit, but… it provides for and commands the one who is ruled, considering his advantage – that of the weaker – and not that of the stronger.” He says that decent men rule because they fear being ruled by a worse man were they to choose not to rule, and so they rule out of necessity, and the ruled “choose to be benefited by another rather than to take the trouble of benefiting another.”

Thrasymachus maintains that injustice is more profitable than justice, and says that justice is high-minded innocence and injustice is good counsel. He says that “those who can do injustice perfectly… and are able to subjugate cities and tribes” are good and prudent. He says that injustice is among virtue and wisdom, and justice is among their opposites. Socrates says, “if you had set injustice down as profitable but had nevertheless agreed that it is viciousness or shameful… we would have something to say… But as it is… injustice is fair and mighty, and, since you also dared to set it down in the camp of virtue and wisdom, you’ll set down to its account all the other things which we used to set down as belonging to the just”, and Thrasymachus agrees.

When Socrates asks Thrasymachus whether the just man and the unjust man would want to and would claim they deserve to get the better of each other, he says yes. He also says that “the just man is like the wise and good, but the unjust man like the bad and unlearned.” He says that the good and wise man will want to get the better of the unlike, while the bad and unlearned man will want to get the better of both the like and the unlike. Socrates says, “the just man has revealed himself to us as good and wise, and the unjust man unlearned and bad”, and Thrasymachus uneasily agrees to this.

Socrates says, “if justice is indeed both wisdom and virtue… it is also mightier than injustice, since injustice is lack of learning”. Thrasymachus tells Socrates that justice is not wisdom, and therefore a city that enslaves another does so with injustice, but if justice is wisdom, it does so with justice.

Thrasymachus agrees that injustice produces quarrels, justice produces friendship, and that if a group of people with some common unjust enterprise would be more able to accomplish something if they didn’t act unjustly to each other. Likewise, Thrasymachus agrees with Socrates’ assertion that if injustice should come into being within one man, that man will cease to be of one mind with himself, and he would be an enemy to himself, to just men, and to gods.

Socrates and Thrasymachus agree that there is some work and some virtue that belong to a horse, and to eyes and ears. Socrates asks if things could do their work if their virtue were to be replaced with vice, and Thrasymachus says that they would work badly. They agree that the soul must have some virtue, and that it would not accomplish its work were it deprived of its virtue. Socrates reiterates that the virtue of the soul is justice, and argues that this means that the just man and the just soul will have a good life, and that “it is not profitable to be wretched; rather it is profitable to be happy”, and also that “injustice is never more profitable than justice.” Thrasymachus ends the discussion by saying that he does not know what the just is, nor whether it is a virtue or whether a just man is happy or unhappy.


Originally Written in October or November 2007 as a college essay



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Aristotle and Rousseau on the Natural Political Association of Men

    
Aristotle (384-322 BC) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)

While Rousseau and Aristotle both understand that labor creates a need for self-sufficiency, the two authors’ views on what is natural, what relationships are natural, how to view natural skills, and the division of labor differ greatly. Rousseau’s arguments are supported better than Aristotle’s.

Aristotle claims that “man is by nature a political animal” “in a higher degree than… other… animals,” and that the political association “completes and fulfills the nature of man… and he is himself ‘naturally a polis-animal.”

Aristotle sees language as a method of signifying perceptions of pleasure and pain, good and evil, and the just and the unjust to one another, and to declare what is advantageous. He believes that associations between people communicating what things they think are advantageous is what “makes a family and a city.” He says that a “final and perfect association, formed from a number of villages” “may be said to have reached the height of full self-sufficiency,” coming into existence for the sake of life and “for the sake of a good life.”

Aristotle’s asserts that “master and slave have accordingly a common interest,” which he supports by saying that an intelligent person whom can exercise forethought “is naturally a ruling and master element” while a person whom can use his bodily power to do physical work “is a ruled element.”

Aristotle agrees with Rousseau that the master / slave relationship is, or at least should be, one that exists for the mutual benefit of both, although Rousseau would not consider such a relationship “natural.” Rousseau believes that our reciprocal dependence on each other is what makes it necessary for each of us to do some work for the benefit of all of society, and that to enslave someone is to create in him dependence on others.

Rousseau thinks that political inequality is established or authorized by the consent of men, whom afford each other different privileges. He believes that slavery did not exist in the state of nature. He says, “since the bonds of servitude are formed only from the mutual dependence of men and the reciprocal needs that unite them, it is impossible to enslave a man without first putting him in the position of being unable to do without another; a situation which, as it did not exist in the state of nature, leaves each man there free of the yoke, and renders vain the law of the stronger.”

We must take into consideration the way our authors think of nature. Aristotle says, “Nature… makes nothing in vain,” and “Nature… makes each separate thing for a separate end; and she does so because the instrument is most perfectly made when it serves a single purpose and not a variety of purposes.” He believes that "every city exists by nature; the ‘nature’ of things consists in their end or consummation.”

Rousseau believes that in the state of nature, “all things move in… a uniform manner… the face of the earth is not subject to those brusque and continual changes caused by the passions and inconstancy of united peoples.” He considers the moment  at which  humans  left the state of nature “the moment when, right taking the place of violence, nature was subjected to law; to explain by what sequence of marvels the strong could resolve to serve the weak, and the people to buy imaginary repose at the price of real felicity.”

People attempt to get out of the state of nature by seeing nature and subjecting it to law, according to Rousseau. He claims that the “first source of inequality among men” is the perfection and deterioration of some individuals whom acquire diverse qualities “which were not inherent in their nature.”

When Aristotle writes that an intelligent master whom can exercise forethought in order to enslave a person suited to physical work, he calls the master a “naturally… ruling… element.” Aristotle thinks the master/slave relationship is a natural one, while Rousseau disagrees. Since, according to Rousseau, we leave nature by subjecting it to law, he would be likely to say that we could end what Aristotle considers “natural” slavery (although Rousseau himself would not share in that designation) by incorporating a system of justice, law, and equality into slavery, and ensuring that neither slave nor master takes advantage of the other without willingly giving something of himself.

If Aristotle thinks that “the ‘nature of things consists in their end or consummation”, then it would be reasonable to expect him to think that the nature of human political society is one that is complete; a polis which is all the villages of the world united. On the contrary, Aristotle thinks that some people are naturally suited to rule, and some are naturally suited to work and be subject to rule. His view that “Nature…  makes each separate thing for… a single purpose and not a variety of purposes” seems problematic because this is to suggest that a person who is born a slave shall never become free or even a master. Aristotle’s view that a master will always be a master and a slave will always be a slave will certainly not bring about a polis of all united villages because there will always be those who claim they have authority over other people, and the master / slave relationship will often be subject to abuses.

Rousseau’s view that men leave the state of nature by observing it and imposing upon it a system of law is better supported than Aristotle’s argument. Rousseau believes that reciprocal dependence makes work necessary, but he does not use this to justify the taking of slaves. He understands that mutual dependence causes people to work together, performing different tasks at different times, so that all tasks may be accomplished simultaneously and the benefits accorded equally to all members of society.

Aristotle’s view of nature suggests that he would not want people to have diverse job training, as “Nature… makes each separate thing for… a single purpose and not a variety of purposes.” Believing in such a statement would seem likely to contribute to disorder and undermine the cause of societal self-sufficiency, because it would make a farmer idle in the winter, as he would have no crops to tend to.




Written in April or May 2008



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