Showing posts with label arbitration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label arbitration. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 2, 2015

Protecting Victims Through the Abolition of Law

Originally Written on August 21st, 2015
Expanded on December 3rd, 2015
 
Edited on December 3rd, 2015 and January 22nd, 2016



            Libertarianism is perhaps best known for its opposition to laws that criminalize victimless actions; for example, the use and sale of drugs, prostitution, pornography, file-sharing, offensive speech, and (arguably victimless) tax dodging, et cetera.
            But I would like to argue that consistent libertarianism additionally opposes laws that criminalize actions which do have victims. This is partially due to the fact that the victims can become accused criminals in the process, and also fall victim to lack of justice. It is also due to the libertarian’s position that laws (statutes and ordinances drafted by legislative bodies) should be replaced with private, mutual contracts.
 
Victims can become repeat victims of injustice, in that some laws against victimizing people come with statutes of limitations; laws that limit justiciable remedy based on how long the victim went without reporting the crime.
In such situations, even if the criminal attempts to turn himself in, lawyers will most likely advise him against turning himself in, and moreover, police might not even arrest him unless he is doing something unlawful at the moment of the police encounter.
The result of all this that – since it is the state’s responsibility to charge a perpetrator with a crime, and the victim may only charge the accused with civil rather than criminal charges – the victim becomes disempowered.
The effect is, or might as well be, as if the victim has been the property of the state all along. If the state doesn’t care about the damage that its property (that is, the victimized human being) suffered, then the state doesn’t have any responsibility to ensure that justice is delivered. Furthermore, the state will suffer no repercussions, because it can continue to compel the victim to remain its client (i.e., its citizen), and no other agency can effectively challenge the state’s failure to deliver justice.
This is true even when the reason why the victim waited so long to report the crime, is because the victim had been so viciously traumatized, that it took years or decades to notice that the crime had even occurred, and/or that it took that long for the victim to relocate to a sufficiently safe space where reporting the crime would be a safe enough option to consider.
 
My proposed solution to this set of problems is that all laws made through legislative avenues be immediately abolished, leaving law and precedent to arise only through private, mutually agreeable contracts. Such contracts should be enforced by neutral third party arbitrators having no substantial vested interest in the outcome of the resolution of the dispute, creating precedent (precedent which resembles, but is not, legislation) through court decisions, and through interlocking arbitration agreements (which are norms and customary standards which govern how courts and arbitrators interact).
Such a paradigm would render all infractions – even true corpus delicti crimes against persons and their legitimate property – torts (i.e., civil matters) rather than criminal matters. Such a paradigm – a system of private law – would retain for the victim (or his or her loved ones, if the victim is deceased) the right to charge the accused with civil violations, as well as the right to hold the accused person(s) responsible for any damages.
 

Wednesday, May 7, 2014

Agorist Protection Agencies and Syndicates Thereof

Written in May 2013,
edited in May 2014



     One of the ways [Samuel E.] Konkin [III] wrote that Agorist protection agencies (if all were threatened by invasion by the State) could defend themselves against the State, would be for the counter-economy to form “larger syndicates than the ones they form [if] a local protection company [goes] renegade” – and to “[generate] the syndicates of protection agencies sufficiently large to defend against the remnant of the State” – by means of “policy holders of all the insurance and protection companies… throw[ing] all their combined resources… on defense of the common ground”.

     “Large syndicates of market protection agencies are containing the State by defending those who have signed up for protection-insurance.”

     “…actual physical confrontation with the State’s enforcers must await the market’s generation of protection agency syndicates of sufficient strength; all else is premature.”

     “The most motivated New Libertarians will move into the research and development supply for the budding agorist protection and arbitration agencies and lastly as directors of the protection company syndicates.”

     “The collapse of the State leaves only mopping up operations. Since the insurance and protection companies see no State to defend against, the syndicate of allied protectors collapses into competition and the NLA [New Libertarian Alliance] - its support gone - dissolves. Statists apprehended pay restoration and if they live long enough to discharge their debts, are re-integrated as productive entrepreneurs (Their “training” comes automatically as they work off their debt.)”



For more entries on enterprise, business, business alliance, and markets, please visit:
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2010/10/enlightened-catallaxy-reciprocally.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/04/labor-protectionism.html

For more entries on theory of government, please visit:

Sunday, April 20, 2014

John Locke, Roderick Long, and Voluntary Taxation

Written on October 6th, 2012
as an e-mail to Panarchist John Zube



   The following was written in regard to Roderick Long's criticism of John Locke's justification for the Leviathan as an endorsement of monopoly government.

   Long uses a three-person desert island scenario to show that it is unfair for one person to wield the ability to always resolve the disputes of others, because that one person might be given too much leeway to resolve potential disputes which concern him in his own favor.

   This leads me to wonder whether voluntary governance can only occur if individuals are required to submit disputes which they cannot resolve among themselves to some - although not necessarily (and preferably not) always the same - neutral, fair, independent, and uninterested arbiter.

   I think it is choice - minimally restrained; restrained to selection from among the existing set of alternatives - that makes government voluntary, more than it is freedom to self-govern which does so.

   This is because an ungoverned person is free to intervene in disputes which do not involve him without others asking, and free to act in a way that affects others without their knowledge and / or consent (anarchy = tyranny / Statism; panarchy is neither anarchist nor Statist).

   This is the argument I make to defend the notion that my taxation plan is truly voluntary, because to create perfect competition requires that persons become insured against harm to personal and property harm, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that most public goods provision would be linked to - and resemble (as in the Agorist formulation) - insurance.


   My understanding of Konkin's and / or Robert Murphy's views on the topic is that self-governance should not be prohibited, but that society would boycott uninsured / ungoverned individuals due to the risks involved.




For more entries on justice, crime, and punishment, please visit:
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2010/10/thrasymachus-support-for-justice-being.html
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/04/social-policies-for-2012-us-house.html

For more entries on taxation, please visit:
http://www.aquarianagrarian.blogspot.com/2014/05/tax-cuts.html

For more entries on theory of government, please visit:

How to Fold Two Square Pieces of Card Stock into a Box

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